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movement outcomes during key phases of mobilizations that aim to impact policymaking. It does so by 
comparing two anti-corruption initiatives in Brazil that became legislative bills through popular petition and 
included the employment of digital media to support them: the Ficha Limpa (or Clean State Law) and the 
Ten Measures Against Corruption (TMAC) campaigns. Based on in-depth interviews with key activists and 
secondary sources, including an analysis of the campaigns’ digital media content, this study evaluates three 
types of outcomes in the political realm: access, agenda, and policy responsiveness. Although both anti-
corruption initiatives elicited public preference and placed their legal inputs in the public agenda of the 
political system, they were not equally successful in converting their ideas into new legislation. The Ten 
Measures was a campaign that occurred when the digital affordances for civil society actors were 
considerably higher, but it did not achieve positive outcomes as the Ficha Limpa did. This article suggests 
that initiatives focusing more on online mobilization strategies without a clear advocacy approach to 
negotiate with (and pressure) public officials do not seem to be enough to promote policy changes. 
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This article explores a new line of inquiry on how digital media are incorporated in the mechanisms that 
lead to social movement impacts in the political realm. We look at how digital media foster the intersections 
between bottom-up and top-down efforts and project people’s demands in policymaking cycles (Schumaker 
1975). Within the flourishing literature on social movement outcomes, the focus has been on impacts to 
political systems, including voting rights (Amenta et al. 2010; Andrews 1997; McAdam 1982), on the 
emergence of new political actors, among them social movement organizations converted into political parties 
(Goldstone 2003), and on activists’ abilities to influence the policymaking cycle (Schumaker 1975; Gamson 
1975). However, we only have superficial knowledge about the role that digital media play in shaping social 
movement outcomes at the policymaking level.  
Despite some exceptions that shed light on various forms of digital activism (Earl 2016; Romanos and 
Sábada 2016; Richez et al. 2020), we still need to understand how digital media intertwine with the 
mechanisms that sustain social movement outcomes, how already explored mechanisms might change because 
of the employment of digital media and, ultimately, which types of impact activists’ employment of digital 
media in the framework of their campaigns can promote in policymaking. Doing this is particularly important 
because, as literature on media studies also suggests, digital media are ubiquitous today and their presence is 
deeply entrenched in the tissues of societies (Couldry and Hepp 2017). In this regard, activists make no 
exception: digital media are important resources that activists employ to increase citizen participation, 
including in law-making, as they offer feasible civic interaction opportunities. This is particularly true of those 
with political motivation and access to the Internet in democratic societies (Dahlgren 2005). In fact, there is a 
wealth of knowledge on how activists’ use of digital media supports organizations or protests (Bennett and 
Segerberg 2013), changes the patterns of visibility for social movements (Uldam 2018), contributes to the 
formation of collective identities (Kavada 2015), reshapes the repertoire of contention (Earl and Kimport 
2011), and supports the diffusion of mobilizations from country to country (Rone 2020).  
This article aims to go further by assessing the role of digital media on three types of outcomes in the 
political realm — access, agenda, and policy responsiveness — and their respective mechanisms. To do so, 
we investigate two recent anti-corruption initiatives in Brazil: Ficha Limpa (or Clean State Law) and the Ten 
Measures Against Corruption (TMAC), which became bills through popular petition and included the 
employment of digital media to support the campaigns in all their stages. They had almost opposite results, 
with the former being considered an example of a successful anti-corruption campaign and the latter being 
evaluated as an example of a failed anti-corruption campaign from the organizers’ perspective.  
Anti-corruption campaigns are valuable case studies to explore social movement outcomes since corruption 
is both an appealing and sensitive topic, often surrounded by different pressures both from those who want and 
do not want greater social and horizontal accountability mechanisms. While social accountability is understood 
here as the engagement of citizens in practices aiming at making officials answerable for their actions, 
horizontal accountability encompasses official checks and balances within intragovernmental agencies 
(O’Donnell 1998; Bovens 2007; Grimes 2008). Although it is improbable that someone — even the most 
corrupt politician, for example — will defend the misuse of power for private gains openly, effective anti-
corruption reforms often lack the political will of those in power (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016). 
Moreover, politicians may use anti-corruption policies to legitimize and institutionalize political domination 
by protecting strategic partners and excluding opponents (Huss 2020).  
In this complex scenario, corruption studies consider citizens’ demands and engagement to be vital to 
promote effective reforms (Grimes 2008; Johnston 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). The more organized civil 








are coalitions and partnerships between civil society organizations and other anti-corruption actors in society 
(Johnston 2012; Rahman 2017). Furthermore, technology is highly expected to give a stronger “voice and 
teeth” to citizens (Fox 2015; Peixoto and Fox 2016). By discussing these assumptions in the anti-corruption 
policymaking field, this study questions the role of digital media in mechanisms that sustain the achievement 
of social movement outcomes more broadly. 
The remainder of this article develops as follows. First, it discusses the overall analytical framework 
employed to guide the analysis. Second, it presents the comparative research design, its rationale, and the 
qualitative methods employed to gather and analyze data on the two campaigns under scrutiny. Third, it offers 
a brief overview of the context in which Ficha Limpa and TMAC developed and a more detailed account of 
their main stages. Fourth, it presents the comparative analysis of the two campaigns, casting light on the 
mechanisms that sustained them, the digital media used, and forms of communication activists took advantage 
of. The concluding section of this paper reflects on the key findings and their implication for the literature on 
social movement outcomes. It indicates that digital media proved to be a flexible resource that is effectively 
intertwined with different mechanisms of the two anti-corruption campaigns. However, using digital media 
without a straightforward advocacy approach does not seem to be enough to advance policy reforms. 
 
 
2. Analytical framework 
 
As our goal in this article is to understand how activists’ use of digital media helped (or not) activists to 
reach their objectives, we adopt a mechanism approach that puts social movement outcomes in a context of 
relationships among a wide array of factors (Tilly 1999; 2001). Mechanisms are usually understood as “a 
delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar 
ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 24). Also, within social movement 
studies, mechanism-based analyzes stress the importance of comprehending how activists’ mobilizations had 
an impact at the political level. We see it as a powerful tool to open the box and show “the cogs and wheels” 
(Elster 1989) of the internal machinery of the policymaking cycle. Focusing on mechanisms is also valuable 
because it allows us to go beyond causal correlations in assessing social movement outcome, hence including 
relational, environmental, and cognitive mechanisms related to meso-level phenomena as collective action 
(Tilly 2001). Considering mechanisms is helpful to develop a nuanced understanding of digital media in 
collective actions and go beyond simplistic generalizations that see digital media as relevant in the support of 
activists’ protests and their outcomes. In our analysis, indeed, we seek to avoid such a simplistic viewpoint on 
digital media concerning social movement outcomes, producing a fine-grained analysis that explains how 
digital media supported various mechanisms during different stages of the two campaigns. In this section, we 
outline the three pillars of our analytical framework: first, a relational perspective able to consider both 
endogenous and exogenous factors in shaping social movement outcomes; then, the focus on mechanisms as 
analytical lenses able to sustain a relational understanding of the two campaigns; finally, the understanding of 
digital media as activists’ resources that change their role according to the stage of the mobilization. 
 
2.1. A relational perspective on social movement outcomes 
 
This article starts from an understanding of activists’ campaigning as a chain of interactions between social 
movement actors and the other political actors surrounding them in a scenario where connected endogenous 
and exogenous factors need to be reckoned in the pathway towards outcomes. Both endogenous and exogenous 








movement outcomes. Endogenous factors are related to the features of movement organizations, including the 
strength of movement organizations, the extent and intensity of their protests, and the strategic choices that 
activists make when they mobilize (Kolb 2007). Exogenous factors, instead, are related to the broader 
environment in which movement organizations operate, including the presence of elites’ conflict and instability 
of political alignments, the strength of counter-mobilization, and the favor of public opinion (Kolb 2007).  
Instead of focusing solely on one set of factors, scholars increasingly attempt to consider the connection 
between exogenous and endogenous elements to explain how social movements achieve their goals. For 
instance, in a well-known piece of research on the outcomes of organizations for homeless, Daniel Cress and 
David Snow (2000) argue that the viability of social movement organizations, the presence of disruptive 
actions, sympathetic allies, local institutions’ support, and well thought diagnostic and prognostic framing 
combined differently and hence led to various patterns towards the achievement of their objectives. Similarly, 
Lorenzo Bosi (2016) considers the connection of two main mechanisms — incorporation and democratization 
— to understand the gradual institutionalization of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland from a 
relational and long-term perspective. Holly McCammon and her co-authors (2001), in turn, suggest that women 
suffrage movements in the United States were able to obtain their goals both due to the presence of favorable 
political and gendered opportunity structures coupled with specific activists’ strategies. Among others, these 
three studies stress a current trend in the literature on social movement outcomes that situates endogenous and 
exogenous factors in a complex network of relations between social movement actors, their constituencies, 
supporters, bystanders, and protest targets. Such literature also considers the concurrent presence of several 
factors that combine across time while mobilizations develop, modify their pitch, and accelerate their pace.  
Drawing on these insights, we apply a relational perspective to assess the role of both exogenous and 
endogenous factors as well as their interplay during the various stages of mobilizations. We argue that even to 
understand one specific type of policy outcome — the introduction of new legislation within a given policy — 
it must be taken into consideration different factors that combine over the course of the same mobilization.  
 
2.2 Mechanisms as analytical lenses 
 
Consistently with what was outlined above, the articles’ analysis consists of splitting the two campaigns 
into more specific mechanisms separated into key phases of the policy cycle, and then looking at how digital 
media combine with each mechanism. In policy cycles, mechanisms support multiple and sequenced outcomes 
in the path from protest-group demands to policy responsiveness (Schumaker 1975). There are three main 
types of outcomes that correspond to access, agenda, and policy responsiveness, respectively (Ibid 1975). They 
usually play a relevant role in the obtainment of broader policy change on specific issues, especially in the 
legislative sphere. First, the access to the legislative process through the proposal of a bill due to the popular 
initiative of civil society actors and experts in the field. Second, the inclusion in the elected MPs’ agenda that 
had to discuss the proposed bill in the parliament. Third, the approval of the proposed bill to be enforced to 
produce a change in the policy realm. Our conceptual framework considers three main mechanisms related to 
each of these three outcomes, whose relevance is also assessed in the extant literature on social movement 
outcomes: the legal inputs mechanism, the public preference mechanism, and the political access mechanism 
(Kolb 2007; Burstein 1999, 2020).  
Although not explored in depth by the literature, the legal inputs mechanism can be seen as a mechanism 
through which activists, movements, and networks can achieve domestic change by elaborating new legislation 
and/or public policy proposals. This mechanism can be activated more easily in countries that allow for a 
popular initiative and is more likely to result in political change if it addresses specific issues with clear and 








Simultaneously, though, it is also a key mechanism for enhancing opportunities to enact such legislation and 
ensure its enforcement. It has, therefore, indirect effects on broader policy outcomes as it can be a way to 
ensure that public policy proposals correspond to citizens’ preferences. Then, the public preference mechanism 
tells us that congruence between majority preferences and movement goals helps social moments to move 
towards their desired outcomes. Finally, the political access mechanism states that the more activists are 
integrated and occupy institutional positions, the greater their political influence and power to reach positive 
responses and achieve the expected impacts (Kolb 2007, 93). The literature suggests that no single mechanism 
can explain the political impacts of social movements (Andrews 1997; Kolb 2007; Burstein and Linton 2002; 
Burstein 2020). This is true also in the case of the two campaigns under investigation, where we can see that 
the interplay of the three mechanisms at different stages of mobilizations was relevant. In the framework of 
this article, therefore, the connection of these mechanisms to each one of the three outcomes is used to guide 
the reconstruction of the two anti-corruption campaigns and to look at how digital media intervene in them. 
 
2.3 Digital media as flexible activists’ resources 
 
In this article, we consider digital media as a diverse array of resources that activists might use to sustain 
their campaigns and their communication repertoire (Mattoni 2012). Digital media might vary greatly one from 
the other: the technological affordances that they grant to activists are different (Comunello et al. 2016). Hence, 
we can fully understand them only when considered in the specific context in which people use digital media 
(Costa 2018). Social media platforms, for instance, favor the engagement of otherwise disconnected 
individuals around the same campaign, hence supporting activists’ efforts to increase the number of people 
they can recruit for their mobilizations. The employment of instant messaging apps may increase the 
organizational capacity of social movement organizations, allowing for the immediate circulation of relevant 
information among activists.  
Technology can also help bridge the space between the demands (from citizens, communities, civil society 
organizations) and the supply made available by governments, law, and policymakers (Gigler and Baijur 2014). 
This is so because technology can lower the costs and barriers to people’s engagement and participation (Earl 
and Kimport 2011; Bennett and Segerberg 2013; Gigler and Baijur 2014; Fox 2015). In line with this, scholars 
studying anti-corruption movements also began to address digital media’s potential to counter corruption from 
the grassroots (Johnston 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Rotberg 2017). Kossow and Kukutschka (2017) argue 
that social media, open data, and other types of digital media empower citizens, allowing them to organize and 
mobilize against corruption and, therefore, render them able to effectively contribute to anti-corruption. Less 
optimistic views state that these types of tools tend to work where governments are already willing to hear 
citizens (Peixoto and Fox 2016) and, thus, many online initiatives end up disappearing or go dormant.  
Due to these differences, it is difficult to make grand claims about the relevance of digital media to support 
anti-corruption efforts from the grassroots. On the contrary, we need to acknowledge that the employment of 
digital media produces multi-faceted mobilizations in which both collective and individual actors are relevant 
and combined according to different patterns (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). At the same time, one type of 
digital media might be vital during the first stage of a social movement’ campaign and less so during its final 
stage: in other words, it is not possible to claim that digital media are relevant for mobilization without 
considering the stage of the campaign when activists are using them (della Porta and Mattoni 2015). These 
aspects are crucial when investigating social movements’ outcomes and, more specifically, how digital media 











3. Research Design and Methods 
 
This article is based on a comparative research that contrasts two case studies that have many traits in 
common when it comes to their key features, although they differ regarding their outcomes. Both campaigns 
against corruption rested on widespread non-violent collective actions, were supported by large social 
movements’ coalitions, had resources including, but not limited to, financial support and knowledge, and dealt 
with the same contentious issue in the same country. Furthermore, both initiatives employed various digital 
media to support their campaigns and, as such, they are emblematic examples of one specific type of Internet 
activism: online facilitation of offline activism (Earl 2016). They successfully collected the required number 
of wet ink signatures to propose their respective bills, but only one of them transformed the petition signed by 
two million people into a new anti-corruption law. While the Ficha Limpa (or Clean State Law) was rapidly 
approved with few changes in 2010, the Ten Measures Against Corruption (TMAC) has been under discussion 
since 2016 and has faced backlash and there have been substantial changes to its original proposal.  
We acknowledge there is a temporal gap between the two initiatives — the Ficha Limpa became law in 
2010, and the TMAC started being developed in 2014 — and this difference can be considered crucial in terms 
of technological advances and the consequent activists’ employment of digital media to support the two 
campaigns. However, the two campaigns already have tangible outcomes, and the fact that the older initiative 
is the successful one allows us to treat the technological time gap as an exogenous variable. One could argue 
that in 2010 activists’ use of digital media was something newer and more disruptive than in 2012-2016 when 
people were already more used to digital pressure and, therefore, there was no need to apply more radical or 
innovative methods to get attention. However, we have reason to believe the novelty effect tends to have a 
greater impact on outcomes where policymakers are more likely to be susceptible to new types of massive 
pressure they have not experienced before — this is particularly the case in countries like Brazil where political 
corruption is systemic and societal accountability is still being developed. Therefore, just repeating the same 
formula of, for example, generating buzz on social media and/or email overload may not be enough to be heard 
and implement sensitive policy such as anti-corruption legislation. 
We focus on reconstructing the sequence of events to understand the processes and how they may differ 
regarding the use of digital media in the three key phases of both popular initiatives: drafting the bill, signature 
collection, and pressure over MPs to approve the anti-corruption legislation. Accordingly, we assess the 
different online and offline strategies implemented and explore whether there were significant technological 
changes in the repertoire and performances through time that entangle with the mechanisms at work in the 
three stages of the campaigns and, ultimately, with the activists’ desired outcomes.  
The article draws on two different datasets, each related to the two case studies. The first includes several 
types of documents related to the two campaigns, such as content available in both initiatives’ official websites 
and their respective social media accounts, on Facebook and Twitter. To retrieve the data, we used search tools 
such as Twitter Advanced Search and Wayback Machine. The latter allows users to see how the two campaign 
websites looked in the past and navigate them. In addition, data was collected from the Brazilian Senate and 
Lower Chamber website, which allowed us to have access to official documents such as reports and drafts of 
the bills and to recover statements made by the MPs, to ascertain the successive stages of both anti-corruption 
mobilizations. The second dataset includes semi-structured interviews and one informal conversation with 13 
key actors who had decision-making power and/or actively participated in Ficha Limpa (seven individuals) 
and TMAC (six individuals). Participants were those involved in designing the bills, collecting signatures, 
negotiating with MPs, and/or engaged with both initiatives’ online strategies. They were all anonymized with 








A combination of a pre-determined set of questions with open and prompted questions was used. The 
interviews were conducted in Portuguese using online platforms or by phone, mainly in October and November 
2020, totaling 13 hours of recorded material. Interviews were complemented with secondary sources including 
academic and non-academic writings on the two case studies (i.e., Melchiori 2011; Tanaka 2011; Breuer and 
Farooq 2012; Beyerle, 2014; Oliveira 2016; Whitaker 2016; Lagunes and Rose-Ackerman 2017; Carmo 2018). 
The analyzes of the two datasets followed a combination of inductive and deductive strategies. The first dataset 
was initially analyzed following an inductive coding strategy, looking for the most relevant narratives, repeated 
topics, and different approaches followed in the two campaigns. This stage of the analysis resulted in the 
emergence of three key mechanisms that we found at work in the three campaigns. The coding scheme related 
to the three mechanisms was then employed, in a more deductive fashion, to analyze the semi-structured 
interviews focusing on the role that various types of digital media had in each of the three mechanisms, also 
considering the role of each interviewee and which campaign they contributed to.  
As Tilly (1999, 255-256) reminds us, “there is no way to trace outcomes of such complex social processes 
without having robust descriptions and explanations of their operations”. Accordingly, this qualitative study’s 
research strategy was influenced by the analytic narrative approach because it pays close attention to stories, 
accounts, and context (Bates et al. 1998, 2000; Levi and Weingast 2016). This article combines narratives with 
the description of the context in a textured and sequenced account, as the analytic narrative suggests (Levi and 
Weingast 2016), to identify the campaign’s main actors, their strategic actions, and their key decisions 
regarding social mobilization and congressional approach. This specific methodological approach also offers 
the opportunity of developing models and extracting empirically testable and general assumptions from 
particular cases (Bates et al. 1998). This approach maintains similarities with process tracing due to its 
emphasis on the sequenced fine-grained description as a means for making inferences (Levi and Weingast 
2016). Although process tracing also aims to generate testable implications, it often prioritizes variables and 
does not focus on key actors and their strategies and exchanges in the same way analytic narrative does (Bates 
et al. 1998; Levi and Weingast 2016).  
 
 
4. Anti-corruption efforts and popular initiatives in Brazil: two case studies 
 
The two campaigns under scrutiny emerged in a highly corrupted political context in which, however, 
accountability institutions, democratic innovations, and civil society initiatives have been vibrant in the past 
decades. Brazil has been accumulating corruption scandals in all branches at the federal, state, and municipal 
levels, with low rates of punishment (Power and Taylor 2011). The Brazilian Congress has an overall 
reputation of being corrupt and unruly (Geddes and Ribeiro 1992; Breuer and Farooq 2012), and its members 
enjoy a high degree of immunity. Considering the anti-corruption agenda, critical legal loopholes remain, but 
congressional representatives have not treated them as an absolute priority nor led attempts to promote 
changes. Even under these circumstances, the Brazilian network of accountability institutions has improved 
its capacity. The country is inching towards accountability with both top-down, mainly through the work of 
law enforcement agencies, and bottom-up initiatives (Praça and Taylor 2014; France 2019), under intense 
pressure not only from civil society but also from international organizations such as the OECD (Odilla 2016).  
Brazil has also been investing in democratic innovations (Avritzer 2009; Rossini and Oliveira 2016) and 
institutions designed to foster citizens’ participation in political decision making (Whitaker 2016). The 
repertoire of social movements and collective actors in the country goes beyond contention when interacting 
with the state (Carlos, Dowbor and Albuquerque 2017). Lessons from Brazil also tell us that citizen 








successful popular initiatives after the demands made in popular public petitions became the basis of new laws 
(Nichter 2011; Melchiori 2011; Calgaro 2017) — two of them are related to anti-corruption mechanisms and 
involved the same core group of activists and supporters (the Anti-Vote-Buying Law and the Ficha Limpa)1. 
However, all four popular initiatives had to be officially sponsored by one or a group of politicians who 
presented the bills as their authors due to the lack of capacity of the Congress to check each signature and the 
fact that digital or electronic signatures are not accepted. It is also important to bear in mind that the legislative 
process encompasses several steps. Overall, in Brazil, for a popular legislative initiative to succeed fully, it is 
necessary that the initiative: 1) has the required number of signatures to propose a bill; 2) is approved by the 
legislature; 3) is sanctioned and later enforced by the executive. Thus, more is needed than citizens’ willingness 
and their signatures.  
As Brazilian parties’ organization is weak and most of the parties present programmatic incoherence, not 
only the electoral campaigns but also parliamentary mandates are “highly individualistic” (Samuels 2001a; 
2001b). Not surprisingly, Brazil is known for its substantial number of parties with seats in Congress — 22 
parties had seats at the beginning of the 2006-2010 legislature in the Lower Chamber and 28 in the 2011-2014 
legislature (Câmara dos Deputados nd). Governmental coalitions are not strictly party based but often likely 
to be stratified by geographic regions or by thematic caucuses (informal issue-specific trans-party groupings 
of legislators) and operate mainly based on pork-barrel politics (Limongi 2007). Therefore, to analyze the law-
making outcomes we focus more on the political elites supporting or reacting to anti-corruption bills rather 
than on the partisan composition of the Congress. Because we recognize that political elites are not monolithic 
units, we look at tactics used by activists not only to build up multi-party coalitions with the support of those 
who embraced the bills but also to pressure the ones who were reluctant or openly against the proposals, 
particularly within Congress. In the case of congressional members, the degree of opposition tends to vary 
depending not only on their electorate’s preferences, but also on whether they can be personally impacted by 
a given policy. Hence, if politicians see as high the risk of themselves being punished if anti-corruption bills 
are passed into law, and also if a significant number of their voters does not see new anti-corruption measures 
as a priority, no support is expected from them. Opposition to this type of legislation is not often open, although 
resistance may be mitigated with large-scale pressure or persuasion strategies, especially if they are innovative.  
It is worth mentioning that digital engagement has increased rapidly in Brazil. In 2010, when Ficha Limpa 
was approved, around 36% of the population were online (UOL 2010). Five years later, when the Ten Measures 
campaign was created, around 48% of Brazilians used the Internet (Sprinklr 2015). In 2020, three out of four 
Brazilians, or 74%, claimed to have accessed the Internet at least once in a period of three months, and 
smartphones keep being the main access device (Valente 2020). Even more impressive is the rapid growth of 
social media — for example, Brazil’s Facebook users grew from 2.4 million in 2009 to 8.8 million in 2010 to 
35 million in 2011 (G1 2012). In 2019, Brazil was home to 136.63 million Facebook users (Navarro 2020). 
These figures stress the importance of better understanding the preeminent role digital media may have in 
activism and social movements’ repertoire and outcomes.  
 
1 Approved by Congress in 1994, the first one was the PL-4146/1993 that defines intentional murder as a “heinous crime”, and 
it was proposed after the murder of a famous actress who was the daughter of an equally famous telenovela writer (Calgaro 
2017) and passed even before collecting the necessary number of signatures. The PL-2710/1992, brought to Congress in 1992 
with the necessary 700,000 signatures collected by housing movements (Melchiori 2011), proposed the creation of the National 
Housing Fund, but it was only approved in 2005 (Calgaro 2017; Whitaker 2016). The PL 1517/1999 aiming to prevent vote-









In such a context, two campaigns developed in Brazil between 2007 and 2016 that tackled corruption 
directly from a bottom-up perspective and were selected as our case studies. In the remainder of this section, 
we present their key features and developments. 
 
4.1 The Ficha Limpa campaign 
 
The Ficha Limpa (Clean State Law) bans candidates from running for public office for eight years if their 
convictions for a list of specific crimes have been confirmed on appeal, or if they had resigned to avoid 
impeachment, or lost their positions due to corruption charges. The campaign began in late 2007 as a traditional 
offline collective action and only started using digital media when promoting the final phase of signature 
collection. It became law in June 2010, nine months after the submission before Congress of a bill signed by 
1.6 million people —a noticeably short timeframe for the Brazilian Congress, that on average takes 45 months 
to approve this type of legislative proposal (Jota 2019). The Movement to Combat Electoral Corruption 
(MCCE) — a group representing more than 40 organized civil society organizations, non-profits, and religious 
associations, at the time led by the electoral judge Marlon Reis — coordinated the entire process with the 
strong support of the Catholic Church through the National Confederation of the Bishops of Brazil (CNBB) 
and the Justice and Peace Commission (at that time headed by the social activist Francisco Whitaker, one of 
the founders of the World Social Forum). The law has been successfully preventing candidates with a dirty 
record from running for office since the 2012 elections. The initiative also had unexpected positive outcomes: 
it has been used as a requirement for federal select civil servants (Brant 2019) and representatives of many 
clubs, associations, and condominiums and served as an inspiration for other attempts to promote legislative 
reforms through popular petitions (Interviewee 6).  
 
4.2 The Ten Measures Against Corruption campaign 
 
The Ten Measures Against Corruption (TMAC) initiative was launched by the Brazilian prosecution service 
in the wave of the Car Wash Operation (Lava Jato) and used digital media as its main driver from the 
beginning. Prosecutors led by Deltan Dallagnol, the then head of the Lava Jato task force, which has been 
investigating and bringing corruption charges against top-level politicians, senior bureaucrats, and powerful 
businesspeople, developed a legislative package of 20 bills combined in ten topics to encourage the prosecution 
of corruption cases and to diminish impunity.2 Despite having collected around two million wet ink signatures 
 
2 TMAC included a package of bills that can be separated in ten key topics (Ayres 2016a; Ayres 2016b), summarized 
as following: 1) Corruption prevention and whistleblowing protection by, for example, using up to 20% of governmental 
marketing funds in campaigns against corruption and by allowing investigations to be triggered by 
anonymous whistleblowers’ complaints; 2) Criminalization of illicit enrichment of public officials with 3 to 8 years of 
incarceration and seizure of assets; 3) Increased sanctions for corruption cases from the current 2 to 12 years to 12 to 25 years 
of incarceration; 4) Changes to criminal proceedings to speed up the process by executing the sentence even when appeals are 
pending in the superior courts; 5) Creation of specialized courts for improbity cases; 6) Reform the statute of limitations aiming 
to reduce impunity; 7) Limiting what is considering illegally obtained evidence to adjust the criminal nullity rules; 8) 
Criminalizing the use of slush funds and punishing parties that use them to finance campaigns; 9) Pre-trial detention to locate 
and ensure the return of ill-gotten gains); 10) New mechanisms for recovering goods and profits derived from influence peddling, 
corruption and misuse of public goods. As can be seen, it was an attempt to promote a robust anti-corruption legal reform at a 
time when a large number of congressional people were being investigated or prosecuted for corruption, money laundering and 








to submit the bill before Congress in 2016, TMAC was not initially designed to be a citizens’ legislative 
proposal. It started at the end of 2014 as an initiative of a few prosecutors and was later institutionally embraced 
by the Federal Prosecutor’s Service. Civil society was invited to take a more active role in subscribing to the 
bills when initiators realized their proposal was facing open opposition from different governmental actors, 
including members of the judiciary and MPs. In September 2021, the bills were still pending congressional 
approval after being substantially modified from the Task Force’s original proposal. There were other 
unexpected outcomes, such as the approval of a bill criminalizing abuse of authority committed by public 
agents as a direct reaction against the prosecutors who were simultaneously negotiating the Ten Measures and 
bringing charges against MPs for corruption in courts (Clavery 2017).  
 
 
5. Digital media, mechanisms and outcomes in the Ficha Limpa and TMAC 
campaigns 
 
In this section, we present our analysis related to the two anti-corruption campaigns that we briefly described 
above. We show that it is not possible to speak about the role of digital media in shaping social movement 
outcomes in abstract terms. Rather, the analysis of the two campaigns illustrates that different types of digital 
media were intertwined with different types of mechanisms at various stages of each campaign. When asked 
to talk about the role and the importance of the digital media in both campaigns, interviewees agreed that, 
although a strong tool to spread the word and call attention to a cause, they were not able to replace more 
traditional offline activities, such as the negotiations with MPs that are more effective when carried out face-
to-face. Interviewees also pointed out that e-signatures are still not accepted in Brazil. Therefore, the 
campaigns need to be able to attract supporters and make them sign the forms and, preferably, engage in joint 
efforts to get more signatures.  
The two cases provide evidence that specific types of digital media strategies were used by the two 
campaigns differently at various stages and, hence, with diverse mechanisms that led to the social movement 
outcomes. In what follows, we develop our analysis pointing out the main mechanism that characterizes each 
of the three stages as well as how digital media was involved in any given mechanism. As stated above, the 
overall aim of this article is to understand how diverse types of digital media had a role not so much in 
determining the outcomes of Ficha Limpa and TMAC, but rather to grasp how they were used in the 
mechanisms that led to such outcomes. With this aim in mind, each of the three sections below analyzes the 
two campaigns in a comparative fashion, exploring the three mechanisms in key phases.  
 
5.1 Digital media in the three phases and the related mechanisms 
 
The phase of drafting the bill and the legal input mechanism 
 
The MCCE (Movement to Combat Electoral Corruption) was launched in 2002 to “keep mobilizing the 
energy” (Interviewee 1) of the so-called “9840 committees” that were operating on a voluntary and informal 
— mainly offline — basis to oversee the enforcement of the already mentioned Anti-Vote-Buying Law, or 
Law 9840. With both MCCE, officially registered as an NGO in 2007, and the Law 9840 well established, a 
new anti-corruption popular initiative emerged. A bishop from Rio suggested the CNBB should take action 
after a politician was allowed to run for office in 2006 while being prosecuted for several crimes, among them 
tax evasion, fraud, and aggravated assault (Melchiori 2011). It was only in 2007, after a face-to-face meeting 








of the bill was begun collectively, with the help of pundits with a legal background, and was polished in debates 
with other members of the MCCE. Their goal and message were straightforward: obtain popular support and 
handwritten signatures to pass a bill that forbids those with criminal backgrounds from running for office at 
all levels of government. The role of digital media in this phase was very limited and linked to internal 
communications that, at that time, circulated information mainly through phone calls but also through emails.  
Interviewee 1 summarizes the legal input mechanism during this phase: 
 
“The Clean Slate Bill started with a very offline campaign. In 2007 the idea came up, presented by the 
bishop Dom Dimas Lara Barbosa, then the general secretary of CNBB, who thought there should be a stricter 
electoral law. We started discussing the bill in June and in December 2007 we approved the idea" 
(Interviewee1). 
  
In the case of TMAC, the drafting phase was restricted to a small group of prosecutors. In late 2014, six 
prosecutors who were part of the Car Wash Operation (Lava Jato) task force started crafting a legal reform in 
an attempt to have better tools to fight corruption. Led by Deltan Dallagnol, around 20 prosecutors across the 
country were mobilized to help to finalize the legislative package of bills to encourage the prosecution of 
corruption cases and to diminish impunity. The Federal Police officers linked to the Lava Jato probe were 
invited to design the anti-corruption package but declined. The group used mainly email and messaging apps 
such WhatsApp as the space to exchange versions of the texts and to discuss the bills. Despite the emergence 
of new digital platforms and software, the interaction with digital media during this phase was also largely 
linked to internal communications, as was the case with Ficha Limpa. No other social movement actors or 
organizations were involved because it could “delay the process” (Interviewee 13). The small group of 
prosecutors were in a rush to, according to the interviewees, avoid a backlash against the investigation. 
Interviewee 13, who was involved in all phases of TMAC, explains their rationale:  
 
“The mindset was: at any moment the Lava Jato investigation could be stopped or declared null. (…) It was 
evident that the corruption scandal would reach Congress, and what we were doing was offering an opportunity 
to the MPs to turn over a new page and change reality. (…) Today, looking back, it was absolutely naïve. It 
was our rationale though, based on our lack of experience of how the system works” (Interviewee 13).  
 
Unlike Ficha Limpa, TMAC was initially developed without a clear strategy. First, Dallagnol thought about 
introducing TMAC as part of the work of the Lava Jato task force. He was persuaded by some peers to separate 
the proposed reform from the investigative work and managed to get institutional support from the General 
Office of the Prosecution Service (PGR). TMAC faced internal resistance once prosecutors and civil servants 
realized the prosecution service’s role is not a policymaking one, and that the initiative could create issues 
regarding the separation of powers, according to Interviewees 4, 7, 11. And yet TMAC was officially launched 
as an institutional initiative at a press conference in Brasília in March 2015, when it was announced that the 
draft bills would be sent directly to Congress and the material made available on the prosecution service’s 
official website3. Although the launch was covered by the mainstream media, Interviewee 13 said that TMAC 
rapidly stopped attracting public attention. This was when Dallagnol decided to cross the country to participate 
in face to face talks promoted on social media but organized by a broad array of actors in churches, universities, 
and professional associations to talk about the Lava Jato probe and promote TMAC. 
 
 









The phase of collecting signatures and the public preference mechanism 
 
Due to the earlier more conventional experience of those who were leading the mobilization process, Ficha 
Limpa started collecting signatures by strongly relying on local networks, especially parishes and the “9840 
committees”, printed material, and on word of mouth to coordinate face-to-face activities. The MCCE’s 
website was created only in June 2008, mainly to offer news, standard flyers and supporting forms to be signed 
and printed. Communication at that time was done mainly by phone and email. However, the campaigners 
introduced novel tactical usages of digital media, although only in a quasi-experimental way when the 
mobilization was already in an advanced phase. Only two campaign leaders were using their personal social 
media accounts on Facebook and Orkut to officially promote the bill during the final phase of signature 
collections in 2009. The MCCE official page on Facebook was launched only in 2010 when the bill was already 
in Congress.  
Interviewees 1, 6, and 8, who were involved in the communication strategy of Ficha Limpa, highlight how 
social media was, initially, used intuitively, based on “improvisation” with no clear online strategy: 
 
“I was doing research at the University of Cologne when I told a professor there in Germany that we were 
doing the campaign and she asked if we were using Facebook to mobilize people. I said that I was not a 
Facebook user, I had heard about it, but few people used Facebook in Brazil. Then I told her that the largest 
social media network at that time was Orkut, which she had never heard of. Then she told me ... she insisted: 
look, if I were you, I would create a group on Facebook, this will help. In fact, when I came back to Brazil I 
did it and it really helped a lot” (Interviewee 1). 
  
“I remember that we had only two social network accounts. I was responsible for one and another person was 
responsible for the other, and we started making contacts, posting messages, and encouraging people. This 
ended up gaining strength in a very organic way. It was the Orkut where I was active. And honestly, I don’t 
even remember what the other one was. I don’t know if it was already Facebook” (Interviewee 6). 
  
“Today, looking back … It was 2010 but it looked like the 1990s. Really, we were very behind the times. 
Orkut was going under; I don’t think we had a Twitter account. It was basically Facebook and a precarious 
website” (Interviewee 8). 
  
Still, the MCCE managed to build an online community of roughly three million members (Breuer and 
Farooq 2012, 8). The Ficha Limpa campaign spread rapidly on the Internet, even where there were no 
organizers: #fichalimpa was the most used hashtag of the week on Twitter Brazil on several occasions. The 
campaign also arrived on YouTube, and Ning, a commercial platform used to tailor campaigns on social 
networks through supporters (Breuer and Farooq 2012, p. 8; Tanaka 2011). In August 2009, the movement 
already had one million signatures and it intensified its digital media use with an event streamed live to launch 
the campaign “300,000 in 30 days” to gather the missing signatures — the website crashed due to its lack of 
capacity to host so much traffic. By the end of September 2009, the MCCE had collected the necessary number 
of physical signatures and they were submitted together with the Ficha Limpa bill before Congress. In parallel, 
the organizers also had the support of over 30 MPs from different parties with whom they had regular 
breakfasts at the bishop's headquarters. This group of MPs presented the bill as their own to move it faster.  
In the case of TMAC, the online communication strategy came before the decision to encourage people to 








overseen designing and implementing a professional communication campaign. The idea to transform the anti-
corruption legal package into a popular petition came from a person in the audience during one of Dallagnol’s 
talks in mid-2015 and it was inspired by the Ficha Limpa, according to Interviewee 13. This was when the 
communication team launched a new website (MPF 2020) — initially created by Dallagnol himself and later 
redesigned by professionals, says Interviewee 11 — and profiles on Twitter, Facebook, and later on Instagram 
were created to promote the campaign, and to mobilize people and organize collective actions during the 
signature collection phase. The prosecution service also mobilized its own staff to collect signatures. 
The popularity of the Lava Jato investigation and the active presence of prosecutors on both social and more 
traditional media helped the campaign to use interpersonal, group, and mass communication simultaneously 
(Oliveira 2016). Although only one person was looking after the official social media accounts in the 
prosecution service, the online mobilization went viral thanks to the sharable content. TMAC’s social media 
page offered illustrated cards, and also showed people signing the forms and invited people to go to signature 
collection points. Images of Lava Jato’s task force members giving speeches or meeting supporters were also 
published, along with pictures of artists supporting the campaign on social media. TMAC’s official website 
offered resources to reinforce the campaign’s visibility and message, such as T-shirts, stickers, and even 
billboards, along with the form to be printed and signed to support the bill. An advertisement agency was hired 
to produce material to be circulated in the mainstream media outlets. 
During the signature collection phase, around 1,000 institutions were mobilized to help persuade people to 
subscribe to TMAC, including religious groups, universities, associations, shopping malls, companies, and 
non-governmental organizations that had formally joined forces to support the campaign by collecting the wet 
ink signatures (MPF 2017). In March 2016, seven months after starting the campaign for subscriptions, the 
mobilization had enough signatures to submit the popular anti-corruption initiative to Congress (Oliveira 2016; 
Lagunes and Ackerman 2017). 
  
The phase of negotiating with powerholders and the political access mechanism 
 
Although the Ficha Limpa bill was endorsed by 1.6 million voters, the MCCE’s leaders knew that without 
keeping and increasing social mobilization MPs would never approve it (Beyerle 2014). Avaaz.org, a US 
organization established to promote global activism, was invited to join forces to make participants and 
supporters more informed and connected. Avaaz helped to pressure politicians when they were voting for the 
bill in Congress, inaugurating a new online strategy for Ficha Limpa that included e-petitions, newsletters and 
calls for action that encompassed, but was not limited to, spreading posts on social media and uploading 
hashtags, directly phoning MPs’ offices and/or flooding the legislators’ email inboxes every time the bill was 
being discussed in the special committees and on the main floor. Interviewees 5, 6 and 10 remembered that 
politicians started to complain about the number of emails and phone calls they received.  
In a couple of months, Avaaz’s online petition was signed by 400,000 citizens (Breuer and Farooq 2012). 
The advocacy group also benefited from Ficha Limpa: at the outset of the campaign, in February 2010, Avaaz 
had around 130,000 members in Brazil and by April that year, this number had grown to 600,000 (Tanaka 
2011; Beyerle 2014). Interviewees 1, 6, 9 and 10 stress the importance of articulating online and offline 
strategies to keep people mobilized both on social media and demonstrations on the streets for the bill, a clear 
advocacy approach in the Congress and a massive coverage and open support of the mainstream media, though 
that came only at the end. 









“We knew it would be very difficult to pass the bill because over half of the Lower Chamber and the Senate 
were allegedly accused of corruption (…) We launched the online petition a bit before the signatures were 
submitted before Congress and we helped with social pressure during all the legislative process. (…) We 
developed a combination of online and social pressure along with efficient advocacy efforts (…) There was 
this novelty in our online mobilization that was especially important. It was the first campaign of this type that 
was viral in Brazil. That got hundreds of thousands of people taking part and applying real political pressure” 
(Interviewee 9). 
  
According to the interviewees, they lobbied hard inside and outside Congress. Even before the bill’s 
submission, MCCE representatives kept having periodic meetings in person with MPs from different parties, 
primarily with those who were supportive of the bill, and contacting powerholders and also active long-time 
activists such as grassroots movements linked to the Catholic Church, unions, and professional organizations. 
The goal was to approach mainly party leaders and thematic caucus key figures to help them to convince 
politicians who were hesitant in passing the bill. Activists contacted politicians not only in Brasília but also in 
their constituencies to persuade them to vote for the bill. Previous experience made Ficha Limpa creators also 
leave extra room for face to face negotiation that involved changing specific items from the original proposal. 
For example, instead of having a conviction ruled by the first instance of the judiciary, it became necessary to 
be sentenced by more than one judge for someone to be barred from public office for eight years (Melchiori 
2011; Whitaker 2016) — the bill attracted a lot of controversy in this regard due to the fundamental principle 
of presumption of innocence.  
When the bill had arrived in Congress, in September 2009, the organizers brought 27 children who were 
around 10 years old — as a reference to the 10th anniversary of the Anti-Vote-Buying Law — carrying flags 
from each of the 27 states of Brazil. A group of 33 MPs from ten parties from both opposition and coalition 
agreed to sign and present the bill to avoid the signature checking and speed up the process. Still, activists 
heard from a congressional representative that “it is easier for a cow to fly than for this initiative to get approved 
in Brazil” (Beyerle 2014; Whitaker 2016). Face-to-face advocacy and the tactical use of digital media were 
then intensified, and protests and even more theatrical demonstrations were organized, such as supporters 
washing the front door of the Brazilian parliament with pails of water and brooms to “clean” it. The use of 
different forms of collective action and the parallel deployment of multiple forms of activist communication, 
was crucial to reduce the initial resistance among many legislators, many of them members of the support 
coalition of President Lula and some of them also defendants in a criminal procedure at the Supreme Court, 
and to overcome the many attempts to delay and thwart the bill’s passage and even to subvert the original 
proposal (Beyerle 2014; Melchiori 2011).  
When the Lower Chamber approved Ficha Limpa, 390 (76%) out of 513 MPs were present and only one 
voted against it. In the Senate, 76 representatives out of 81 were present, and they all voted for its approval. In 
June 2010 — four months before the general elections — the legislation was enacted by President Lula who, 
ironically, was kept off the ballot eight years later due to the Ficha Limpa law. Since then, the legislation has 
been applied to banning hundreds of candidates from each election. Interviewees believe that the bill passed 
because many congressional representatives thought the new law would never be enforced against them due 
to the low level of sanctions against politicians who enjoy privileged jurisdiction (foro privilegiado) in Brazil4. 
However, as Interviewees 5 and 6 note, they must never lower their guard because politicians can change the 
 
4 Congressional representatives enjoy the right to be investigated and stand trial in criminal proceedings only by the Supreme 
Court, where conviction rates are 0.74%. See https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/estudo-mostra-que-68-de-acoes-penais-de-quem-








legislation and, therefore, it is important to be aware and be able to rapidly mobilize people against any attempt 
to subvert the rules they fought to see approved.  
Despite the opposite outcome, some of the strategies used by TMAC in this phase bear certain similarities 
to Ficha Limpa. Although it was endorsed by almost two million signatures, TMAC was initially supported 
by a group of congressional members because the Lower Chamber did not have any mechanism to check and 
confirm each signature (Oliveira 2016). The MPs were part of the anti-corruption caucus and decided to author 
TMAC. Intentionally, the most famous prosecutors avoided going to Congress to submit the signatures, in an 
attempt to not connect the initiative to the prosecution service, according to the interviewees. But the picture 
of Dallagnol on a massive banner was in the same room with civil society representatives. 
In fact, TMAC was not only inspired by, but also tried to replicate some of the strategies used at the Ficha 
Limpa, such as having children submit the signatures, celebrities supporting the campaign and trying to call 
for online action when the bills were about to be voted on. TMAC supporters often called for tuitaços, i.e., the 
collective upload of hashtags on Twitter.5 This initially worked and pushed the then Speaker of the Lower 
Chamber to create a special committee to evaluate the proposals, says Interviewee 13. There were also some 
street demonstrations for the Lava Jato investigations asking for the approval of TMAC (Lima 2016). Although 
it met with public support and collected thousands of signatures, interviewees agree that TMAC has always 
been seen as an initiative that was created and led by the prosecutors directly involved in the Lava Jato probe. 
In addition, although it had a professional team carrying out the digital campaign, it was not as innovative as 
the Ficha Limpa in terms of how activists used digital media, particularly during the phase in which public 
preference needed to be translated into intense pressure over politicians. 
The prosecutors leading the campaign also faced a great deal of resistance among jurists and MPs. 
Congressional members were ready to react against both the Lava Jato probe and TMAC as the investigation 
was rapidly advancing against powerful politicians, among them congressional members, including the bill's 
rapporteur. At the time, TMAC’s rapporteur — who had also received slush electoral funding — stated his 
peers were concerned only about their personal interests and they voted driven by revenge (Sambrana 2016). 
Interviewee 7 summarizes the negotiation phase: 
 
“It was as if we wanted to negotiate peace without ceasing fire, dropping a bomb over the enemy’s head. Then 
it (TMAC) becomes a life and death battle. (…) In this context, there was no negotiator who could handle it. 
The moment was very adverse. (...) The scenario was very adverse, very hostile.” (Interviewee 7) 
  
Interviewees also recognized prosecutors did not have the expertise, although they kept having face-to-face 
meetings with MPs, many of whom were under investigation or already being prosecuted and reluctant to 
legislate against their own or their peers’ interests. Interviewees 13 and 2 mention that the presence of better 
organized civil society groups in Congress would have helped. In fact, they recognize that collective action 
was fragile due to the lack of more institutionalized organizations leading the negotiation phase. Despite being 
endorsed by over two million people, TMAC faced backlash and open opposition from different actors, 
including from members of the judiciary, and were stymied by Congress. In November 2016, of the original 
Ten Measures designed by the prosecutors, only one was fully approved on the Lower Chamber’s floor: the 
increase of sanctions for corruption cases from the current 2 to 12 years to 12 to 25 years of incarceration. 6 
 
5 See https://twitter.com/MPF_PGR/status/800798091431460892. Accessed on December 15, 2020. 
6 On November 30, 2016, the by then already modified and extended to “12 measures” against corruption were voted on late at 









After that, the TMAC official website and its social media accounts stopped being updated. The changed bills 
were sent to the Senate and were still to be voted on a second time in the Lower Chamber in March 2021.  
Due to all this, interviewees’ answers on TMAC’s outcomes vary significantly, from a “catastrophic” failure 
(Interviewee 12) to “frustration with some learning” (Interviewee 4) to having the “great virtue to mobilize, to 
galvanize this anti-corruption agenda in the Brazilian middle class” (Interviewee 7). In the case of Ficha 
Limpa, instead, outcomes exceeded expectations in a positive way. Not only has the bill been actively banning 
politicians from running for office, but also the idea of having public officials and other types of representatives 
with clean records has been expanded. However, politicians with any obstacle embraced by the Ficha Limpa 
have been constantly trying to change the legislation and to circumvent it by appointing their spouses, relatives, 
or people with whom the voter could associate as substitutes (Marques 2020). 
 
  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
In the previous section, we presented the main findings related to our analysis, which cast light on the role 
that various types of digital media played regarding the three main mechanisms that characterized the key 
phases of the two popular initiatives in Brazil. While adopting a mechanism approach to look at the 
policymaking process, we provided a dense description of how different types of factors interplayed in the two 
anti-corruption campaigns to develop a fine-grained understanding of how they achieved (or not) their initial 
aims. Below, Table 1 summarizes the research findings. It underlines how activists used different types of 
digital media in the two initiatives to sustain a change in the policy agenda and bring their law proposals to 
Congress; to gain visibility as well as incorporate and mobilize members; to attract favorable public opinion 
and media coverage; to wage contentious strategies and tactics, and, finally, to pressure powerholders, 
negotiate and convert preferences into votes for their respective bills.  
 
Table 1 – Mechanisms, type of media, communication and activities to which they apply 
Phase Mechanisms Type of Media Type of Communication 
1.Bill drafting  Legal Inputs (elaborating 
new legislation and/or 
public policies proposals) 










Ficha Limpa: mainly offline 
with face-to-face meetings 
(people with legal knowledge 
representing their 
professional associations in 
co-operation with religious 
movements and other SCOs, 
part of the MCCE).  
 
 
TMAC: online, with extensive 
exchange of online messages 
 
as punishing parties that use slush funds, criminalizing illicit enrichment of public officials, and new mechanisms for recovering 
goods, the package was amended to create criminal liability for investigators and judges who abuse their power by acting based 
on political-party motivations or for recklessly prosecuting public agents for administrative improbity. The changes were so 
substantial that the Lava Jato task force threatened to resign. At the time, TMAC’s rapporteur stated that his peers were 








TMAC: group messaging 
apps such as WhatsApp and 
Telegram, and email 
(restricted to a small group 




(making public opinion to 
shape public policy and 
law-making through 
rational anticipation by 
policymakers and through 
electoral turnover) 
 
Ficha Limpa: mainstream 
media, email, and later social 







TMAC: mainstream media, 
digital media (social media, 
website, group messaging 
apps) and website. 
Ficha Limpa: started offline 
(with printed material, face 
to face group meetings, 
positive coverage of 
mainstream media), and in 
the final phase introduced 
online tools (social media).  
 
 
TMAC: combined online 
(circulating official content 
on social media and the 
campaign website) and 
offline (organizers’ talks, 
meetings with local 
leaderships, interviews with 
mainstream and alternative 







(becoming more integrated 
into the policymaking 
process) 
Ficha Limpa: e-petition by 
Avaaz, mailing lists, social 
media (Orkut, Facebook, 
YouTube, Ning, Twitter) 
















TMAC: social media (Twitter, 
Facebook, Instagram, 
Ficha Limpa: hybrid strategy 
combining offline 
(demonstrations, lobby on 
the floor in Congress and in 
the MPs’ constituencies, 
interviews/press conferences 
to mainstream and 
alternative outlets) and 
online advocacy tactics 
(calling for action to flood 
MPs’ mailboxes, call their 
offices, upload hashtags). 
The same joint strategy was 
used to guarantee its 
enactment by the president 
and to pressure the Supreme 




TMAC: online tactics (more 








YouTube), group messaging 
apps such as WhatsApp and 
Telegram, and mainstream 
media. 
uploading hashtags) but also 
offline strategies (talks and 
meetings with MPs, hearings 




Source: Authors, based on Kolb (2007) and Burstein (1999, 2020) 
 
The type of media and communication strategies varied between the two cases, particularly regarding the 
legal input mechanism. The main reason, in this case, is the lack of technological resources available for Ficha 
Limpa activists such as WhatsApp and Telegram and the lower level of engagement on social media at that 
time. Overall, the digital media proved helpful in what Burstein and Linton (2002) called the “pre-policy part” 
of the policy process. Although serving more as an internal communication tool in the phase of designing the 
proposal, the use of digital media amplified efforts and created new types of strategies to guarantee the initial 
entry onto the legislative agenda. Both initiatives, however, used hybrid tactics in all phases of the 
policymaking cycle, although TMAC did so in a less innovative way than Ficha Limpa.  
One valid question is to what extent the success of Ficha Limpa had impacted the outcomes of TMAC. In 
particular, interviewees directly involved in the Ten Measures state that the former inspired the latter. In many 
ways, as mentioned, they replicated strategies and activities used in the first initiative. However, the Anti-Vote 
Buying Law campaign and its offspring community, particularly the one linked to the Catholic Church, have 
played a crucial role in the Ficha Limpa mobilization wave. Simultaneously, the Ten Measures’ restricted 
group of creators did not count on the full support of these relationships. TMAC attracted other groups with 
very limited or no experience in advocacy and public policy actions. One possible explanation for the TMAC 
failure could be the “glass cliff” metaphor, in this case, non-traditional activists with little advocacy knowledge 
trying to act in the political realm. There is yet another more counterintuitive explanation. Ficha Limpa’s 
remarkable strike against the political class with a dirty background created a kind of “threshold effect” among 
powerholders. In other words, it may have increased the level of effort needed to break political resistance and 
enact any other popular anti-corruption initiative in Brazil, although data collected in this study does not 
indicate this. However, further research with MPs may be necessary to draw such a conclusion. Besides, anti-
corruption proposals are usually very likely to attract attention and popular support but have low political 
interest, especially where officeholders perceive this type of legislation as detrimental. 
Overall, the results suggest that to increase the chances of succeeding in the policy arena it is necessary to 
select communicative goals and the types of digital media that interplay with the three mechanisms in an 
effective way: 
1. Creating a solid communicative space for the interaction of different types of individual and collective 
actors so as to foster a law proposal that is collectively constructed and exhaustively discussed with key civil 
society organizations before submitting it to the legislature;  
2.  Having an appealing proposal with a simple and clear message that can be spread on multiple digital 
media at the same time to increase the likelihood of attracting the attention of the broad public; 
3. Having the capacity to develop clear online and offline joint strategies for social mobilization and 
advocacy, mainly in the negotiation phase with MPs to successfully pass the legislation, and later with other 
powerholders to guarantee its enforcement.  
The two cases analyzed here also tell us that these three major features increase the chances of 








initiative that needs a minimum number of signatures to be submitted and depends on the political system to 
be enacted. Although these findings are tremendously valuable for the nascent field of anti-corruption studies, 
they allow reflections that go beyond this area of investigation. Lessons learnt here suggest that legal input 
mechanisms combined with online and offline tactics are likely to increase the odds of citizens and civil society 
organizations who advocate for policies to effectively persuade powerholders to fully support their public 
policy preferences — even the ones made to be enforced against public officials’ own interests, as is the case 
with anti-corruption legislation that can be used to punish the very politicians who are enacting it.   
Although the political domain of social movement outcomes has been far more frequently studied than 
cultural and biographical effects (Bosi and Uba 2009), this article aimed to contribute to this debate by 
assessing the role of digital media in social participation through law-making in all stages of the policy process 
and by bringing collective actions against corruption to the scene. Both are still largely unexplored topics. Even 
though there has been little theoretical disagreement that advocacy works because of its connection to election 
outcomes (Burstein 2020, 5) — and we also considered that electoral politics is relevant — the mechanisms 
under analysis here indicated that SMOs and interest groups can convert collective interests into policy 
proposals, insert their claims in the political agenda and, eventually, get what they want not only when 
politicians sympathetic to their views win office.  
As this study suggests, the chances of achieving policy change are significantly enhanced with an appealing 
proposal with a bold message that has been collectively discussed and drafted before being submitted, along 
with clear strategies of negotiation (and political pressure) that combine online and offline tactics. Digital 
media can easily amplify the effect of strategies in all phases of the policymaking process, particularly when 
creating awareness and when public support is needed. From this perspective, digital media is a flexible 
resource that might effectively be combined with other mechanisms at various stages of the same mobilization. 
However, we need to notice that digital media alone may be not enough to promote outcomes, especially if the 
movement’s organizations do not combine digital media with other types of media and do not adopt offline 
strategies to negotiate. From this viewpoint, our findings also have a broader methodological implication for 
the literature on social movement outcomes. Indeed, the analytical reconstruction of the entanglement between 
mechanisms, types of digital media, and forms of communication showed that digital media are, of course, 
relevant, but face-to-face communication and more traditional media are equally important. This is in line with 
studies suggesting looking at media and social movements from an encompassing viewpoint, going beyond 
the focus on just one type of media at a time and rather considering the whole “repertoire of communication” 
(Mattoni 2012) that activists deploy when mobilizing.  
In short, this article illustrated how highly digitalized campaigns include other communication forms that 
do not necessarily rely only on digital media. A more comprehensive understanding of how the mechanisms 
that lead to social movement outcomes unfold during mobilizations, waves of mobilizations, and cycles of 
contention cannot be separated from an appreciation of the broader communication strategies that activists 
decide to employ, without focusing solely on the newest digital media that activists use in their campaigns. In 
this regard, it is striking to notice how TMAC was a campaign that occurred when the digital affordances for 
civil society actors were considerably higher than those that activists could count on during 
the Ficha Limpa campaign. This also means that similarly to what happens in the case of political opportunities 
(Goodwin and Jasper 2004), it is not enough to have digital media available in societies for activists deciding 
to use them and do so effectively. As we showed, collectively constructed bills, along with leaders with both 
prestige and expertise to negotiate with congressional members, are as important as the rise of calls for urgent 
progress obtained through activists’ engagement with digital media.  
We also need to acknowledge that these resources may be less relevant in negotiating with political elites in 








use of digital media but were unsuccessful not only because of the lack of expertise in advocacy and building 
civil society coalitions but also due to the generally adverse political conditions, and the fact that potential 
targets of the new legal reform were many MPs appreciating the proposals and their close allies. This points 
to the fact that there is a partial interaction between media, context, and targets. Although the literature 
already links endogenous and exogenous factors to explain how social movements reach their aims, the two 
cases point to the importance of the existence of interaction between mobilization strength, lobby capacity and 
alliance building, a high level of political interest often boosted by temporal proximity to an electoral period, 
and politicians experiencing new forms of pressure to increase their interest in passing popular initiatives.   
Such findings also speak to the (anti-)corruption literature which is closely interested in understanding how 
to enhance various types of accountability mechanisms in societies. More specifically, we illustrated that civil 
society actors and social movement processes are indeed relevant in the creation of horizontal 
accountability mechanisms. This connects with what the literature has said about more structured civil society 
organizations being more likely to achieve better outcomes and the importance of joint efforts between civil 
society organizations and other anti-corruption actors (Johnston 2012). Consistent with what the literature on 
anti-corruption studies stresses about combining bottom-up and top-down approaches, a possibility for citizens 
to effectively redress corruption may start from the legal input mechanism but is not limited to it.  
Despite drawing on two specific case studies situated in the Brazilian context, we believe that this paper 
might offer relevant insights to understand other types of anti-corruption efforts from the grassroots across the 
world, especially when it comes to the interplay between activists’ collective actions and digital media 
in impacting anti-corruption norms. Indeed, like Carlos, Dowbor and Albuquerque (2017) noted, research 
carried out in Brazil brought a new perspective on collective action’s institutionalization beyond the specific 
country context. Institutions and key actors of the political system have been incorporated by scholars 
into their analyzes to better explore different dynamics and interactions between movements and the state that 
is by far not limited to the repertoire of contention in Brazil. Furthermore, we have strong reasons to believe 
that our findings on the role of digital media in mechanisms that sustain the outcomes of anti-corruption 
mobilizations are not limited to campaigns that deal with this social problem. However, to develop a solid 
generalization about the intricate relationship between digital media, collective action mechanisms, and social 
movements outcomes, our findings need to be tested with activists’ campaigns, both successful and 
unsuccessful in obtaining policy change, with regard to other contentious issues than corruption, other 




Amenta, E., N. Caren, E. Chiarello, and Y. Su (2010), “The political consequences of social movements”, 
Annual Review of Sociology v. 36, p. 287-307, 2010. 
Andrews, K.T. (1997), “The Impacts of Social Movements on the Political Process: The Civil Rights 
Movement and Black Electoral Politics in Mississippi”, American Sociological Review 62: 800–819. 
Avritzer, L. (2009), Participatory institutions in democratic Brazil, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press. 
Ayres, C. (2016a), “Ten Measures Proposed by the Brazilian Federal Prosecution Service to Fight Corruption 
(Part I)”, FCPAmericas blog.  
Ayres, C. (2016b), “Ten Measures Proposed by the Brazilian Federal Prosecution Service to Fight Corruption 
(Part II)”, FCPAmericas blog.  
Bates, R. H., A. Greif, M. Levi, J. Rosenthal, and B.R. Weingast (2000), “The Analytical Narrative Project”, 








Bates, R.H., A. Greif, M. Levi, and J. Rosenthal (1998), Analytic Narratives, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
Bennett, W.L. and A. Segerberg (2013), The Logic of Connective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Beyerle, S. (2014), Curtailing Corruption: People Power for Accountability and Justice, Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Brant, D. (2019), “Governo Bolsonaro amplia regras de ficha limpa para servidores”, Folha de S.Paulo. 
Retrieved Nov 27, 2020. (https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/07/governo-bolsonaro-amplia-regras-
de-ficha-limpa-para-servidores.shtml). 
Breuer, A. and B. Farooq (2012), “Online Political Participation: Slacktivism or Efficiency Increased 
Activism? Evidence from the Brazilian Ficha Limpa Campaign”, Prepared for delivery at the 2012 ICA 
Annual Conference, San Francisco, May 24 - 28. 
Bosi, L. (2016), “Incorporation and Democratization. The Long-Term Process of Institutionalization of the 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement”, in L. Bosi, M. Giugni, and K. Uba (eds.), The Consequences of 
Social Movements, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 338-360. 
Bosi, L. and K. Uba (2009), “Introduction: The Outcomes of Social Movements”, Mobilization: An 
International Journal 14(4): 409-415.  
Bovens, M. (2007), “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework”, European Law 
Journal, 13(4), 447–468. 
Burstein, P. (1999), “Social movements and public policy”, in M. Giugni, D. McAdam, and C.Tilly (eds.), 
How Social Movements Matter, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 3-21. 
Burstein, P. (2020), “Testing Theories about Advocacy and Public Policy”, Perspectives on Politics, p.p. 1-
12. 
Burstein, P. and A. Linton (2002), “The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement 
Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns”, Social Forces, Vol. 81, 
No. 2 (Dec., 2002), pp. 381-408.  
Calgaro, F. (2017), “Em quase 30 anos, Congresso aprovou 4 projetos de iniciativa popular, G1. Retrieved 
April 5, 2020. (https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/em-quase-30-anos-congresso-aprovou-4-projetos-de-
iniciativa-popular.ghtml). 
Câmara dos Deputados. (n.d.), Bancada na Posse. Retrieved 18 Feb 2021, 
(https://www.camara.leg.br/deputados/bancada-na-posse). 
Carmo, A. (2018), “Turkeys Do Not Vote for Christmas. The Brazilian Anti-Vote-Buying Law”, Südosteuropa 
66 (2018), no. 3, pp. 325-34. 
Carlos, E., M. Dowbor, and M.C. Albuquerque (2017), “Movimentos sociais e seus efeitos nas políticas 
públicas: Balanço do debate e proposições analíticas”, Civitas - Revista de Ciências Sociais 17(2), pp. 360-
378. 
Clavery, E. (2017), “Entenda o projeto de lei sobre abuso de autoridade”, Estado de S.Paulo. Retrieved 27 
Nov 2020 (https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,entenda-a-lei-de-abuso-de-
autoridade,70002913981). 
Comunello F, S. Mulargia, L. Parisi (2016), “The ‘Proper’ Way to Spread Ideas through Social Media: 
Exploring the Affordances and Constraints of Different Social Media Platforms as Perceived by Italian 
Activists”, The Sociological Review 64(3):515-532. 
Costa, E. (2018), “Affordances-in-Practice: An Ethnographic Critique of Social Media Logic and Context 
Collapse”, New Media & Society 20 (10): 3641–56.  
Couldry, N., and A. Hepp (2017), The Mediated Construction of Reality, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Cress, D. M., and D. A. Snow (2000), “The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of 
Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing”, American Journal of Sociology 105 (4): 1063–
1104. 
Dahlgren, P. (2005), “The Internet, public spheres, and political communication: Dispersion and deliberation”, 








della Porta, D. and A. Mattoni (2015), “Social networking sites in pro-democracy and anti-austerity protests. 
Some thoughts from a social movement perspective”, in D. Trottier and C. Fuchs (eds.), Social Media, 
Politics and the State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in the Age of Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube, London: Routledge, pp. 39–66. 
Earl, J. (2016), “Protest online: Theorizing the consequences of online engagement”, in L. Bosi, M. Giugni, 
and K. Uba (eds.), The Consequences of Social Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
363–400. 
Earl, J., and K. Kimport (2011), Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet Age, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Elster, J. (1989), Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
France, G. (2019), “Brazil: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption”, Transparency International Anti-
Corruption Helpdesk Answer. 29 January 2019. 
Fox, J. A. (2015), “Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?”, World Development, Vol. 
72, pp. 346–361, 2015. 
G1. (2012), “Número de usuários brasileiros no Facebook cresce 298% em 2011”. Retrieved November 8, 
2020 (http://g1.globo.com/tecnologia/noticia/2012/01/numero-de-usuarios-brasileiros-no-facebook-cresce-
298-em-2011.html). 
Gamson, W. (1975), The strategy of social protest, Belmont, California: Wadsworth. 
Geddes, B., and A. Ribeiro Neto (1992), “Institutional Sources of Corruption in Brazil”, Third World Quarterly 
Vol 13, No 4. 
Gigler, B. S., and S. Baijur (eds.) (2014), Closing the feedback loop: Can technology close the accountability 
gap?, Washington: World Bank. 
Goldstone, J. (2003), “Bridging institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics”, in J. Goldstone (ed.), 
States, Parties, and Social Movements (pp. 1–26), Cambridge University Press. 
Goodwin, J., and J.M. Jasper (2004), “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine; The Structural Bias of Political 
Process Theory”, in J. Goodwin and J. M. Jasper (eds.), Rethinking Social Movements. Structure, Meaning, 
and Emotion (pp. 3–30), Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Grimes, M. (2008), “The conditions of successful civil society involvement in combating corruption: A survey 
of case study evidence”, QoG Working Paper Series, 2008:22. 
Huss, O. (2020), How Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policies Sustain Hybrid Regimes - Strategies of 
Political Domination Under Ukraine’s Presidents in 1994–2014, New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press. 
Johnston, M. (2012), “Building a Social Movement Against Corruption”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 
Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring / Summer 2012), pp. 57-74. 
Kavada, A. (2015), “Creating the Collective: Social Media, the Occupy Movement and Its Constitution as a 
Collective Actor”, Information, Communication & Society 18 (8): 872–86. 
Kolb, F. (2007), Protest and Opportunities: The Politics of Outcomes of Social Movements, Frankfurt: 
Campus. 
Kossow, N., and R.M.B Kukutschka (2017), “Civil society and online connectivity: controlling corruption on 
the net?”, Crime, Law and Social Change, 68(4), 459–476.  
Lagunes, P. and S. Rose-Ackerman (2017), “Why Brazil is winning its fight against corruption”, The 
Conversation. February 3, 2017. 
Levi, M. and B.R. Weingast (2016), “Analytic Narratives, Case Studies, and Development”, SSRN.  Retrieved 
March 27, 2020 (http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835704). 
Lima, D. (2016), “Protesto em defesa da Lava Jato reúne manifestantes em 200 cidades do Brasil”, Agência 
Brasil. Retrieved April 10, 2020 (https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2016-12/manifestantes-
lotam-esplanada-em-defesa-da-operacao-lava-jato). 









Marques, J. (2020), “Lei da Ficha Limpa completa 10 anos e deixa legado de ‘candidatos-laranja’”. Folha de 
S.Paulo. Retrieved Nov 28, 2020 (https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/06/lei-da-ficha-limpa-
completa-10-anos-e-deixa-legado-de-candidatos-laranja.shtml). 
Limongi, F. (2007), “Democracy in Brazil: presidentialism, party coalitions and the decision making 
process”, Novos Estudos - CEBRAP, v.3. 
Mattoni, A. (2012), “Repertoires of Communication in Social Movement Processes” in B. Cammaerts, A. 
Mattoni and P. McCurdy (eds.) Mediation and Protest Movements, Bristol: Intellect Books, Pre-proof 
version, pp. 39-56. 
McAdam, D. (1982), Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
McAdam, D., S. Tarrow, and C. Tilly (2001), Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
McCammon, H., K. E. Campbell, E. M. Granberg, and C. Mowery (2001), “How Movements Win: Gendered 
Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women’s Suffrage Movements, 1866 to 1919”, American Sociological 
Review 66 (1): 49–70. 
Melchiori, C. E. (2011), “Participação e representação política: a iniciativa popular de lei o caso do movimento 
de combate à corrupção eleitoral”, Masters dissertation, São Paulo: FGV/EAESP, 2011. 
MPF. (2017), Relatório de resultados do Procurador-Geral da República: diálogo, unidade, transparência, 
profissionalismo, efetividade 2015-2016. Retrieved April 20, 2020 
(http://bibliotecadigital.mpf.mp.br/bdmpf/handle/11549/109606). 
MPF. (2020), 10 medidas contra corrupção. Retrieved December 20, 2020 
(http://www.dezmedidas.mpf.mp.br/apresentacao/historico). 
Mungiu‐Pippidi, A. (2015), The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Navarro, J.G. (2020), “Brazil: number of Facebook users 2017-2025”, Statista.com, Jul 28, 2020. 
Nichter, S. (2011), Vote Buying in Brazil: From Impunity to Prosecution, November 10, 2011. Retrieved 
December 15, 2020 (https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/ruling_politics/files/nichter_-
_vote_buying_in_brazil_-_from_impunity_to_prosecution.pdf). 
Odilla, F. (2016), “Building accountability under intense pressure: lessons from Brazil's 'anti-corruption' 
legislation”, Global Rule of Law Exchange Papers, Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, May 2016. 
O’Donnell, G. (1998), “Horizontal accountability in new democracies”, Journal of Democracy 9.3 (1998) 112-
126. 
Oliveira, F.L. (2016), “Além da Lava Jato: Estratégias de Comunicação do Ministério Público Federal nas 10 
Medidas Contra a Corrupção”, Intercom – Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos Interdisciplinares da 
Comunicação - XXXIX Congresso Brasileiro de Ciências da Comunicação, São Paulo, September 2016. 
Peixoto, T. and J. Fox (2016), “When does ICT-enabled citizen voice lead to government responsiveness?” 
IDS Bulletin, 47(1), 23–40. 
Power, T. J. and M.M. Taylor (eds.) (2011), Corruption and democracy in Brazil: the struggle for 
accountability, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Praça, S. and M.M. Taylor (2014), “Inching Toward Accountability: The Evolution of Brazil’s Anticorruption 
Institutions, 1985-2010”, Latin American Politics and Society 56: 27-48. 
Rahman, K. (2017), “Building on social movements to achieve systemic changes”, Anti-corruption Helpdesk, 
Transparency International.  
Richez, E., V. Raynauld, A. Agi, and A.B. Kartolo (2020), “Unpacking the Political Effects of Social 
Movements With a Strong Digital Component: The Case of #IdleNoMore in Canada”, Social Media + 
Society 6 (2). 
Romanos, E., and I. Sádaba (2016), “From the Street to Institutions through the App: Digitally Enabled 
Political Outcomes of the Spanish Indignados Movement”, Revista Internacional de Sociología 74 (4). 
Rone, J. (2020), Contesting Austerity and Free Trade in the EU: Protest Diffusion in Complex Media and 








Rose‐Ackerman, S. and B.J. Palifka (2016), Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform, 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rossini, P. G. C. and V.V. Oliveira (2016), “E-Democracy and Collaborative Lawmaking: the discussions of 
the political reform in Brazil”, International Journal of Communication v. 10, 2016, p. 4620-4640. 
Rotberg, R.I., (2017), The Corruption Cure: How Citizens and Leaders Can Combat Graf, Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Samuels, D. (2001a), “Money, Elections and Democracy in Brazil”, Latin American Politics and Society 
43:27-48. 
Samuels, D. (2001b), “Incumbents and Challengers on a Level Playing Field: Assesing Impact on Campaign 
Finance in Brazil”, Journal of Politics 63 (2):569-84. 
Sambrana, C. (2016), “O parlamento olhou para o seu umbigo, deu de ombros para a sociedade, diz Onyx 
Lorenzoni”, IstoÉ Dinheiro. Retrieved Nov 28, 2020 (https://www.istoedinheiro.com.br/blogs-e-
colunas/post/20161202/parlamento-olhou-para-seu-umbigo-deu-ombros-para-sociedade-diz-onyx-
lorenzoni/9982). 
Schumaker, P.D. (1975), “Policy Responsiveness to Protest-Group Demands”, The Journal of Politics, May, 
1975, Vol. 37, No. 2 (May, 1975), pp. 488-521. 
Sprinklr. (2015), The Social Media Landscape in Brazil. Retrieved Nov 10 2020 (https://blog.sprinklr.com/wp-
content/uploads/securepdfs/2016/03/20150424_WP_EN_The-Social-Media-Landscape-in-
Brazil_V01.pdf). 
Tanaka, G. (2011), “Ativismo online na Ficha Limpa: A Internet está mudando a política”. TI Especialistas, 
10 jan. 2011.  
Tilly, C. (1999), “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements”, in M. Giugni; D. McAdam and 
C.Tilly (eds.), How Social Movements Matter, University of Minnesota Press. 
Tilly, C. (2001), “Mechanisms in Political Processes”, Annual Review of Political Science 4, 21-41. 
Uldam, J. (2018), “Social Media Visibility: Challenges to Activism”, Media, Culture & Society 40 (1): 41–58. 
UOL (2010), “Brasil é 5º país com maior número de internautas, diz pesquisa”. Retrieved November 3, 2020 
(https://tecnologia.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/redacao/2010/07/27/brasil-e-5-pais-com-maior-numero-de-
internautas-diz-pesquisa.jhtm). 
Valente, J. (2020), “Brasil tem 134 milhoes de usuarios de internet”, Agência Brasil. Retrieved November 15, 
2020 (https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2020-05/brasil-tem-134-milhoes-de-usuarios-de-
internet-aponta-pesquisa).  
Whitaker, C. (2016), “Ficha Limpa - uma lei a defender? (Clean Record – A Law to Defend?)”, Estudos 




The two authors acknowledge that the research for this paper has been conducted in the framework of the 
BIT-ACT project funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 




Alice Mattoni is an Associate Professor at the University of Bologna, in the Department of Political and 
Social Sciences, and the principal investigator of the ERC funded BIT-ACT project. 
 
Fernanda Odilla is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, University 
of Bologna, and affiliated researcher at the King’s Brazil Institute, King’s College London. 
